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Torts and the Construction of Inducement and Contributory Liability in Amazon and Visa 
 
Alfred C. Yen*
 
Introduction 
 
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,1 the Supreme Court adopted 
intentional inducement as a cause of action for third party copyright liability.2 Before Grokster, 
such liability existed in two forms, contributory liability and vicarious liability. Contributory 
liability applied if a defendant had knowledge of infringement by another and materially 
contributed to the infringement.3 Vicarious liability applied if the defendant had control over 
another’s infringement and had a direct financial interest in it.4 Now, after Grokster, a defendant 
also faces liability if she acts with the object of promoting infringement by others.5  
 
The Grokster Court adopted inducement because the traditional doctrines of contributory 
and vicarious liability did not express the full range of reasons that support third party liability. 
In particular, to the extent that such liability rests on a defendant’s culpability, contributory 
liability failed to distinguish the unintended support of infringement that sometimes accompanies 
legitimate activity from the purposeful, deliberate support of infringement. This led to anomalous 
results that the Court decided to fix. 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Law School Fund Scholar, and Director, Emerging Enterprises and Business 
Law Program, Boston College Law School. The author would like to thank John McKee and 
Kara Hurvitz for their research assistance, as well as Columbia Law School and the Columbia-
VLA Journal for Law and the Arts for organizing this symposium. Copyright 2009 Alfred C. 
Yen. All rights reserved. 
1 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
2 Id. at 936-37 (“[T]he inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright. We adopt it here, 
holding that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is 
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”). 
3 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
1971) (“one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ 
infringer.”). Gershwin is the seminal case cited for traditional contributory liability. Although its 
description of the doctrine refers to “inducement,” the vast majority of courts before Grokster 
focused on the elements of knowledge and material contribution. See Faulkner v. Nat’l 
Geographic Soc’y, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he standard for contributory 
infringement has two prongs–the ‘knowledge’ prong and the ‘material contribution’ prong.”); 
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (analyzing knowledge 
and material contribution). 
4 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (establishing 
vicarious liability “[w]hen the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct 
financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials.”); Fonovisa, supra note 3, at 261-
64 (analyzing vicarious liability in terms of control and direct financial interest). 
5 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37. 
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To see this problem, consider the potential contributory liability of an Internet service 
provider (“ISP”) for liability committed by its users. Every service provider that connects large 
numbers of people to the Internet knows that eventually some, perhaps even many, of them will 
eventually commit infringement. This arguably supports a conclusion that the ISP culpably 
contributes to infringement by providing Internet service and ought to pay for the resulting 
damages. However, the well-established and correct interpretation of contributory copyright 
liability rejects the notion that generalized knowledge of eventual infringement supports liability. 
Something more specific, such as notice about specific instances of infringement, is required.6 
This result follows the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the famous case of Sony v. Universal City 
Studios.7 In Sony, the Court held that it is improper to impute culpability to a defendant who 
simply knows that its technology assists infringers.8 If the defendant’s service is capable of 
substantial noninfringing use, liability does not exist.9 Accordingly, courts will not hold ISPs 
generally liable for their users’ infringement because Internet service clearly supports a great 
deal of noninfringing use such as email, web browsing, downloads from iTunes, and shopping. 
 
 This conclusion makes sense. There is nothing culpable about distributing technology for 
legitimate use. If others decide to misuse the technology, responsibility for that misuse generally 
lies with the user, not the provider. Liability against the service provider makes sense only when 
the service is not capable of substantial noninfringing use because, under those conditions, 
effectively no legitimate use for the service exists. A defendant distributing such technology 
would then have no legitimate purpose for doing so, and culpability would follow.10
 
For purposes of contrast, consider the defendants in Grokster, who distributed file-
sharing technology with the express aim of attracting users who wanted to commit 
                                                 
6 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995) (rejecting a blanket theory of liability and considering only the possibility of liability 
after defendant received notice from plaintiff); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Association of Fire 
Equipment Distributors, 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (also rejecting blanket theory of 
liability and considering only liability based only upon defendant ISPs knowledge about the 
existence of infringing material on a particular subscriber’s website); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 
F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2004) (court considers only the possibility of liability arising because 
defendant reasonably should have known that infringing copies plaintiff’s works were stored on 
ISPs computers). 
7 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
8 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 208 (rejecting claim that merely supplying video cassette recorders 
establishes contributory liability in case where defendants knew that individuals sometimes use 
video cassette recorders to infringe). 
9 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (“[T]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of 
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for 
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.”) (emphasis added). 
10 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 932 (“[W]here an article is ‘good for nothing else’ but infringement, … 
there is no injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe.”). 
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infringement.11 Such behavior is culpable because, unlike our hypothetical ISP, the defendants 
distributed their technology for the purpose of causing infringement. They wanted infringement 
to occur. However, the then-existing doctrine of contributory liability did not hold these 
defendants liable because file-sharing technology is “capable of noninfringing use.”12 For 
example, those distributing public domain works or works licensed from copyright holders can 
and do use file-sharing technology. The Ninth Circuit therefore applied Sony to excuse the 
defendants from liability.13
 
The Grokster Court applied inducement as a response to traditional contributory 
liability’s inability to hold intentionally culpable defendants liable. If culpability could not be 
properly inferred from the mere distribution of technology, it could be found if the defendant 
wanted to cause infringement by others. Inducement made sense because those who deliberately 
cause infringement deserve to be held liable for that infringement, even if the technology they 
distribute has substantial noninfringing use.14
 
Inducement had the beneficial effect of closing an apparent loophole in the law of third 
party copyright liability. However, its introduction raised tricky questions about the proper 
construction of the law. In many cases, defendants who would normally not be found liable 
under traditional contributory liability could plausibly be found liable as intentional inducers. 
Consider again our ISP. If the ISP knows that some of its users occasionally commit 
infringement, and the ISP deliberately continues to provide Internet service, doesn’t the ISP now 
intend for the infringement to continue? And if so, does it mean that inducement could supplant 
traditional contributory liability as the primary theory of third party copyright liability? 
 
The answer to this question is not immediately obvious. The Grokster Court indicated 
that inducement exists only when intent was shown “by clear expression or other affirmative 
steps taken to foster infringement.”15 However the Court did not elaborate on the meaning of this 
limitation. Accordingly, lower courts have inherited that task of using common law principles 
                                                 
11 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937-40 (describing deliberate inducement by defendants and concluding 
that “[t]he unlawful objective is unmistakable.”). 
12 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004), 
rev’d 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (lower court finding that Grokster defendants’ software was capable 
of substantial noninfringing use). 
13 Id. at 1157 (affirming judgment in favor of Grokster defendants). 
14 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934-35 (Sony's rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law 
from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product. But nothing in Sony requires courts to 
ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose 
rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.”). 
15 Id. at 937. The Court also stated that “in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would 
be unable to find contributory infringement liability merely based upon a failure to take 
affirmative steps to prevent infringement.” Id. at 939 n. 12. 
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derived from tort16 to delineate the border between intentional inducement and ordinary 
contributory infringement.17
 
This Article examines two recent, closely followed opinions that apply tort law to the 
problem of contributory copyright liability, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.18 and Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Visa International Service Association.19 It makes sense to study these opinions 
because they involved large, high profile businesses whose primary services simultaneously 
supported infringing and noninfringing behavior. In Amazon, the plaintiff Perfect 10 (copyright 
holder in a number of pornographic images) sued Google because Google’s search engine helped 
Internet users find and view infringing copies of the plaintiff’s photographs.20  In Visa, Perfect 
10 sued credit card companies for processing credit card payments on behalf of websites that 
charged users to view infringing images.21
 
Claims like these are both plausible and problematic. The scope of copyright 
infringement on the Internet is significant. It is arguably wrong for businesses to profit from 
assistance provided to illegal activities. Furthermore, if Google and Visa withdrew that 
assistance, the incidence of copyright infringement would presumably decrease.  At the same 
time, however, it is perhaps unfair to hold a business liable for supporting the infringement of 
others when the business did not act with the specific purpose of supporting infringement. 
Moreover, it may be socially undesirable to impose liability on these businesses for two reasons.  
First, attempts to stop infringement may be very costly and ineffective.  Second, while liability 
may force entities like Google and Visa to withdraw their services from those who have 
committed infringement, liability may also cause withdrawal of services that support 
noninfringing behavior. Society must therefore balance the potential benefits of third party 
copyright liability against its associated costs. 
                                                 
16 Id. at 930 (noting origin of third party copyright liability in common law); Id. at 934-35 
(identifying “rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law” as an appropriate basis 
for third party copyright liability). 
17 It is worth taking a moment to clarify the distinction between intentional inducement and 
“ordinary contributory infringement.” As noted earlier, the seminal formulation of contributory 
infringement in Gershwin contained references to inducement and “ordinary contributory 
infringement” (i.e. liability based upon knowledge and material contribution). See supra note 3. 
Accordingly, it is possible to identify both inducement and “ordinary contributory infringement” 
as forms of contributory infringement. This Article refrains from this practice because it can lead 
to the blurring of important distinctions between inducement and “ordinary contributory 
infringement.” 
18 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007), amended 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). This Article analyzes 
the first Amazon opinion because the Ninth Circuit cites that opinion in Visa (the amended 
opinion came down after Visa.). This is strictly a matter of analytic convenience for purposes of 
this Article because construction and interpretation of contributory infringement and inducement 
is the same in both opinions. In referring to these opinions, the Article will refer to the first as 
“Amazon I” and the second as “Amazon II.” 
19 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007). 
20 Amazon I, 487 F.3d at 711-13. 
21 Visa, 494 F.3d at 793. 
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Amazon and Visa try to integrate contributory liability, inducement and tort law, but with 
only modest success. Two problems share the blame. First, the doctrinal formulations of 
contributory copyright liability do not map cleanly onto tort law. Accordingly, those 
formulations distract courts from the considerations most relevant to tort. Second, although both 
opinions acknowledge the importance of tort law to the construction of third party copyright 
liability, they pay insufficient attention to the overall structure of tort, distinctions between basic 
types of tort actions like intentional tort and negligence, and the reasons for those distinctions. 
This robs Amazon and Visa of truly cogent explanations for their results. 
 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the general problem of third party 
copyright liability and its relationship to tort law. Part II shows how tort law explains the results 
of Amazon and Visa. In so doing, Part II demonstrates the benefits of giving third party copyright 
liability a strong foundation in tort. Part III uses Parts I and II to analyze Amazon and Visa. It 
shows how those opinions fail to integrate tort law into copyright, and how this failure robs the 
opinions of cogent explanations for their results. Part IV concludes by arguing that courts can 
improve third party copyright liability by paying closer attention to tort law in two ways. First, 
courts should carefully limit the application of third party copyright liability inspired by 
intentional tort. Instead, courts should generally analyze third party copyright cases under the 
rubric of negligence. Second, courts need to reformulate the doctrine of contributory liability to 
take better account of the considerations of negligence law. This includes the explicit 
consideration of a defendant’s simultaneous support for infringement and noninfringing activity. 
 
I. Third Party Copyright Liability and Tort 
 
A great deal of infringement takes place over the Internet, and copyright holders often 
encounter difficulty when seeking redress against those directly responsible. Those who post 
infringing content on the Internet, whether through websites or peer-to-peer networks, often do 
so anonymously. Many infringers live in foreign countries that may have little interest in 
enforcing American copyright laws. Finally, copyright holders may discover that a particular 
infringer does not have sufficient assets to cover any judgment won.  
 
Copyright holders have responded to these problems by suing business whose activities 
support infringement. Early suits targeted Internet service providers (ISPs) whose servers hosted 
infringing content.22 Later suits expanded the list of defendants to include those who merely 
supported, but did not host, infringing content. These suits have included claims against file 
sharing services,23 Internet auction sites,24 age verification services,25 search engines26 and 
                                                 
22 See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 893 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (suit against 
bulletin board service for infringement committed by users); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-
Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (suit against ISP for 
infringement committed by others). 
23 See Grokster, supra note 1; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
24 See Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
25 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 114 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
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credit card companies.27 Copyright holders find these third party defendants attractive targets for 
suit because their identities are well-known, they must respond to litigation, and they often have 
significant assets from which to pay potential judgments. Moreover, if found liable, these 
defendants would probably respond by acting to discourage infringement. Of course, these 
defendants object to being sued for infringement committed by others, and they do not want to 
investigate or act against those accused of infringement.  
 
The overall structure of tort law offers a framework for resolving these cases. Tort 
liability comes in two types. Most tort liability is fault-based. In tort cases involving fault, courts 
impose liability because the defendant proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries by behaving in 
a faulty (i.e. unreasonable) manner. Fault-based tort liability includes familiar actions for 
intentional torts like battery and negligence. Although a detailed explanation of fault would be 
extremely complicated and beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that fault-based 
tort liability includes the notion that a defendant who has behaved unreasonably is culpable and 
deserves to be held liable for at least some of the consequences of his unreasonable behavior. In 
the case of intentional torts, the culpability arises because the defendant affirmatively hopes to 
harm or offend the victim of his action. In negligence, culpability arises because the defendant 
has not taken reasonable precaution against the risk of harm to the victim. 
 
By contrast, a smaller number of cases involve strict liability, or liability without fault. 
Strict liability governs a relatively small portion of tort law because modern orthodoxy holds that 
a defendant should pay for injuries suffered by others only when the defendant’s faulty behavior 
caused those injuries. Nevertheless, courts occasionally impose strict liability in order to ensure 
the compensation of victims, spread costs, and the encourage safety. This happens primarily in 
three areas – respondeat superior liability of masters for torts committed by servants within the 
scope of employment,28 strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities,29 and strict liability 
for non-negligent sellers of unreasonably unsafe products.30
 
Tort law gives courts three different reasons for holding a defendant liable for 
infringement committed by another. First, the defendant might have intended to cause 
infringement by others. Second, the defendant might have been careless in causing infringement 
by others. Finally, the defendant might be strictly liable for infringement caused by others. Let us 
take a moment to see how tort law separates these forms of liability, particularly (given the topic 
of this Article) intentional tort from negligence.31
                                                                                                                                                             
26 See Amazon I and Amazon II, supra note 18. 
27 See Visa, supra note 19. 
28 See Rest. 3d (Agency) §7.03(2) (2006) (describing respondeat superior). 
29 See Rest. 2d (Torts) §§ 219, 220 (describing strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities); Rest. 3d (Torts) §20 (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005) (same). 
30 See Rest. 3d (Torts-Products Liability) § 1 (liability imposed on sellers of defective products); 
Rest. 2d (Torts) § 402A (same). 
31 Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth saying a little bit about the boundary 
between negligence and strict liability. Describing this boundary is tricky because strict liability 
could easily replace fault as the primary form of tort liability. Modern tort theory justifies strict 
liability on the ground that those who create risk, particularly business enterprises, should bear 
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At first inspection, the distinction between intentional torts and negligence appears 
simple. Intentional torts exist only when a defendant affirmatively wants to harm or offend the 
victim, while negligence requires only that the defendant act with unreasonable carelessness 
towards the victim. There is, however, a gray area that merits further examination. Some 
defendants may not want to harm or offend the victim, but nevertheless act knowing with 
substantial certainty that the undesired result will follow. For example, a hotel may know that 
bedbugs infest one of its rooms. If the hotel rents that room to a guest, it does so knowing with 
substantial certainty that the guest will suffer unwanted bites. Similarly, an automobile 
manufacturer knows that one of its cars will eventually hit a pedestrian. Thus, in a sense, the 
manufacturer makes and sells its cars knowing with substantial certainty that doing so will cause 
injury to a person. 
 
Courts could treat cases like these as intentional tort or negligence. A person who acts 
knowing with substantial certainty that personal injury will follow in a sense desires that 
injury.32 And, of course, such behavior may reflect unreasonable carelessness about harm to 
others. Interestingly, and tellingly for the construction of third party copyright liability, the tort 
system treats the only the former of these cases (i.e. cases like the renting of a bedbug-infested 
room) as intentional tort. The rest are evaluated as negligence cases. Courts do this because 
intentional tort doctrines have a wooden quality that renders them relatively unable to make fine 
distinctions about the circumstances in which a defendant acts. Accordingly, if intentional tort 
                                                                                                                                                             
the costs of those risks. Thus, strict liability encourages those held liable to take precautions, 
raise compensation for losses, and spread costs through insurance. See Gregory C. Keating, The 
Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1266, 1266-77 (1997). 
When taken at face value, the principles behind strict liability justify an extremely broad 
application. Every party with a causal relationship to potential accidents could take further  
precautions, provide compensation, and spread loss. If applied remorselessly, these ideas could 
create practically unlimited liability. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: 
A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461, 
527 (1985) (“The unavoidable implication of the three presuppositions of manufacturer power, 
manufacturer insurance, and internalization is absolute liability.”) For example, a pedestrian run 
over in a crosswalk by a drunk driver could plausibly allege that the driver, car manufacturer, tire 
manufacturer, beer manufacturer, aluminum can manufacturer, grocery store, gas station, and oil 
company had all caused his injury. Courts have, of course, instinctively resisted liability this 
broad because they understand the need for some kind of limiting principle to avoid a thicket of 
liability so extensive that unproductive and absurd results follow. Fault offers such a principle. 
Indeed, fault causes of action, especially negligence, give courts an opportunity to ask the kind of 
nuanced questions about a defendant’s conduct that affect both the defendant’s culpability and 
the social value of the defendant’s behavior. Accordingly, courts have, somewhat arbitrarily, 
limited strict liability actions to a few areas like respondeat superior, abnormally dangerous 
activities and portions of products liability, preferring instead to analyze the vast majority of 
cases under the framework of negligence. 
32 See Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093-94 (1955), appeal after remand, 304 P.2d 681 
(1956) (defendant would have committed battery if he moved a chair knowing with substantial 
certainty that plaintiff would attempt to sit in chair and fall to the ground). 
-7- 
governed both our hypothetical hotel and car manufacturer, overbroad liability would follow. By 
contrast, analyzing these cases under negligence permits the sophisticated reasoning necessary to 
separate the culpable from the non-culpable. 
 
Consider first the hotel’s rental of the bug-infested room. Here, the hotel took a single act 
that exposed the victim to a single, substantially certain risk of injury. Such behavior seems 
comparably culpable to the deliberate imposition of such harm.33  
 
By contrast, the hypothesized car maker may not be culpable at all because its behavior 
exposes multiple potential victims to much-less-than-certain risk. Certainty of harm arises 
through the repeated imposition of this less-than-certain risk. The sale of a single automobile 
creates a small risk of injury to pedestrians. Nevertheless, if enough automobiles get sold, the 
likelihood of injury to at least one pedestrian is substantially certain. This does not necessarily 
mean that the car manufacturer is as culpable as the hotel that rented the bug-infested room. 
Indeed, the manufacturer may not be liable at all. One cannot evaluate the car maker’s 
culpability without knowing more about the specifics of each instance of risk. Were the brakes 
improperly designed? What did the operator of the car do? How did the victim behave? What 
was the weather at the time of the victim’s injury? Did the manufacture of the car provide social 
benefits greater than the risk of harm? The answers to these and countless other questions could 
establish the car maker’s culpable fault, or they could eliminate that possibility. It therefore 
makes little sense to treat the car maker’s case as an instance of intentional tort. Indeed, if the 
behavior of car manufacturers and the like were considered intentional torts, the imposition of 
liability would become absurdly overbroad. For example, a pedestrian run over in a crosswalk by 
a drunk driver could plausibly allege that the car manufacturer, tire manufacturer, beer 
manufacturer, aluminum can manufacturer, grocery store, gas station, and oil company were all 
intentional tortfeasors because each of them sold a product knowing with substantial certainty 
that the product would eventually cause injury. Analyzing such cases under negligence works 
better because its emphasis on the particular circumstances of each defendant’s behavior allows 
courts to weigh various pros and cons before concluding that a defendant’s creation of risk 
justifies liability. This explains why courts restrict intentional tort liability to those cases in 
which a defendant’s behavior creates a single, substantially certain likelihood of harm to the 
victim.34
                                                 
33 See Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2003) (knowing 
rental of bedbug infested room probably battery). 
34 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 1 (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005), 
comment e:  
 
The substantial-certainty definition of intent requires an appreciation of its limits. 
In those occupational-injury cases in which courts have applied the substantial-
certainty test, there generally is a localized job-site hazard, which threatens harm 
to a small number of identifiable employees during a relatively limited period of 
time. Likewise, in Illustration 3, it is the defendant's immediate neighbors whose 
property will be harmed as soon as the defendant engages in its activity. The 
applications of the substantial-certainty test should be limited to situations in 
which the defendant has knowledge to a substantial certainty that the conduct will 
-8- 
II. Applying Tort Law to the Facts of Amazon and Visa 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone within a small class of 
potential victims within a localized area. The test loses its persuasiveness when 
the identity of potential victims becomes vaguer and when in a related way the 
time frame involving the actor's conduct expands and the causal sequence 
connecting conduct and harm becomes more complex. Consider, for example, the 
company engaged in the mass production of products, which are distributed to 
consumers nationwide. The company may well know that in light of the inevitable 
limits of quality control, over time some number of its products will end up 
containing manufacturing defects of the sort that will cause physical injuries. The 
company's knowledge of the certainty of harm, at some undefined time and place, 
does provide an argument in favor of the company's liability. Yet that liability, 
when imposed, is understood as a form of strict liability, not as liability for 
anything that can properly be regarded as an intentional tort. Moreover, in many 
situations a defendant's knowledge of substantially certain harms is entirely 
consistent with the absence of any liability in tort. For example, an owner of land, 
arranging for the construction of a high-rise building, can confidently predict that 
some number of workers will be seriously injured in the course of the 
construction project; the company that runs a railroad can be sure that railroad 
operations will over time result in a significant number of serious personal 
injuries; the manufacturer of knives can easily predict that a certain number of 
persons using its knives will inadvertently cut themselves. Despite their 
knowledge, these actors do not intentionally cause the injuries that result. 
Moreover, despite their knowledge, none of the companies—absent further 
facts—can even be found guilty of negligence; nor does the knowledge possessed 
by the knife manufacturer subject it to liability under products-liability doctrines. 
-9- 
The foregoing sets the stage for a tort-inspired analysis of Amazon and Visa. In Amazon, 
the plaintiff Perfect 10 owned copyright in a number of pornographic images.35 Perfect 10 
alleged that Google was liable for infringement committed by others because Google’s search 
engine helped users gain access to infringing copies of Perfect 10’s images.36 Although Perfect 
10 asserted liability on a number of theories, the claim most relevant to this Article concerned 
“in-line linking” – Google’s practice of automatically indexing images from all over the Internet, 
displaying reduced quality versions of specific images (called “thumbnails”)  in response to user 
queries, and allowing users to gain access to full quality images by clicking on the thumbnails.37 
In-line linking supported infringement because Google’s automatic indexing inevitably included 
infringing versions of images owned by Perfect 10.38 Accordingly, Google’s search engine 
informed users about the existence and location of those infringing images, and users accessed 
those infringing images by clicking on the relevant thumbnails.39  Perfect 10 sued Google and 
moved for a preliminary injunction preventing, among other things, Google’s in-line linking to 
infringing versions of Perfect 10’s photos.40  The District Court denied Perfect 10’s motion, but 
the Ninth Circuit reversed on the issue of contributory infringement. According to the court, the 
District Court erred in holding that Google’s search engine categorically did not “materially 
contribute” to infringement. Instead, the District Court should have recognized that Google’s 
potential liability depended on the specifics of search engine technology and operation. The 
Ninth Circuit therefore remanded the case for further fact finding.41
 
Basic tort law offers a good explanation for Amazon’s result. As an initial matter, Google 
clearly did not commit an intentional tort because Google did not operate its search engine 
hoping to create infringement. True, Google knew with substantial certainty that its search 
engine would eventually support infringement. This substantial certainty was not, however, 
associated with a single, high certainty event like renting out a bedbug-infested room. Instead, 
the certainty arose from thousands (if not millions) of lower risk events, namely the ordinary 
search activities of numerous users. Similarly, the operation of a search engine does not 
correspond well to the existing accepted forms of strict liability. Google did not have a 
principal/agent or master/servant relationship with its users or those posting infringing images.  
Nor did operating a search engine create the unpredictable, high risk of personal injury 
associated with dynamite blasting. And of course, Google did not sell a defective product. 
 
It is possible, however, that Google was negligent. Perfect 10 essentially claimed that 
Google knew its search engine increased the risk of infringement, and that Google failed to take 
a reasonable precaution against that risk – namely disabling or removing search engine results 
related to infringement. Of course, the mere fact that a precaution against risk exists does not 
mean that a defendant must take the precaution to avoid negligence. In order for the defendant to 
                                                 
35 Amazon I, 487 F.3d at 710 (referring to Perfect 10 as owner of copyright images). 
36 Id.  at 713. 
37 Id. at 711-12 (describing in-line linking). 
38 Id. at 713 (referring to Google search engine’s indexing of images). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 713. 
41 Id. at 713, 729. 
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be negligent, the precaution must be reasonable in proportion to the social benefits and losses 
associated with the precaution. 
 
In cases like Amazon, determinations about negligence depend on three factors: the 
difficulty or cost or taking a precaution against infringement, the effectiveness of the precaution 
(i.e. the amount of infringement the precaution stops), and the amount of noninfringing behavior 
simultaneously supported by the defendant. The first two of these are fairly self-explanatory and 
obvious. As any given precaution becomes more difficult or costly for the defendant to 
undertake, courts will be less likely to hold the defendant liable for failing to take it. As the 
amount of infringement stopped by precaution rises, courts would more likely require the 
precaution. The third requires some elaboration, for it highlights the important possibility that 
stopping infringement has unintended consequences that make precaution less socially desirable. 
 
When a defendant supports only infringement, it is easy to find him culpable (i.e. 
negligent) because no legitimate purpose for his behavior exists. However, if the same behavior 
supports both infringing and noninfringing activity, negligence becomes far less clear because 
the social value of the defendant’s support for noninfringing behavior counterbalances the social 
loss of infringement. As a defendant’s support for noninfringing activity grows in relation to any 
support for infringement, it becomes more and more reasonable for the defendant to continue his 
behavior even if support for infringement continues. This is particularly true when a defendant’s 
support for noninfringing activity cannot be separated from his simultaneous support for 
infringement. If such separation were possible, a defendant might be able to take precaution 
against infringement without disturbing noninfringing behavior. However, if separation is not 
possible, then precaution against infringement will also suppress legitimate behavior.  The loss 
of noninfringing behavior constitutes an unintended consequence of precaution that makes 
precaution less socially desirable as the effects on noninfringing behavior increase. 
 
The three factors enumerated here identify the contours of relatively strong and weak 
cases for negligence. In particular, the case for negligence is strong when a defendant can take a 
simple, inexpensive precaution against infringement, the amount of infringement stopped is 
large, and the effect on noninfringing activity is small. Conversely, the case for negligence is 
weak when the precaution is difficult or expensive, when the infringement stopped is relatively 
small, or the effect on noninfringing behavior is large. Moreover, these factors explain the 
Amazon result because they show why the factual record did not contain enough information to 
resolve conclusively the question of Google’s negligence.   
 
From a tort perspective, Google might not be negligent. First, there is the problem of 
scale. While removing a single listing from Google’s search engine results seems simple, the 
removal of many results–particularly in response to complaints from copyright holders–is 
something else. If Google is liable for failing to remove search results in response to Perfect 10’s 
complaints, then presumably Google would be similarly liable for failing to act on complaints 
from any other copyright holder. Since the Internet harbors vast amounts of infringement, 
Google would probably have to employ many people full-time in order to avoid liability, or else 
embark on some kind of massive engineering effort to create an automated method for 
responding to complaints. The cost of these efforts alone make it unclear whether a court could 
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call Google’s failure to implement them unreasonable. Perhaps infringement on the Internet is so 
serious that these costs are justified, or perhaps not. 
 
Second, it is unclear how much infringement Google could actually stop. The removal of 
a particular search result makes it harder for a user to find a given instance of infringement, but it 
does not prevent the infringement. As an initial matter, the infringing material remains on the 
Internet. Additionally, users may be able to employ alternate searches that direct them to the 
infringing material. Finally, the primary infringer (e.g. a website posting infringing images) 
could re-post the infringing content at a different URL or with a different file name. This could 
facilitate the creation of a new search results for the infringing material. 
 
Third, it seems quite likely that Google simultaneously supports infringing and 
noninfringing behavior, and that Google cannot act against infringement without harming 
noninfringing behavior. Some complaints from copyright holders will be mistaken or falsified, so 
Google will probably deliberately suppress noninfringing search results. Even if Google 
somehow managed to act only on verified complaints, it might still inadvertently remove 
noninfringing search results. For example, Google might de-list all search results with a 
particular name (perhaps the name of a particular image whose copyright has been infringed or 
the person depicted in such an image). Such de-listing would remove many search results for 
infringements, but it could easily remove noninfringing results as well. For example, Google 
might suppress licensed postings of a photograph infringed by others, fair use of the photograph, 
noninfringing textual discussion of the photograph, or even postings that have no relation to the 
photograph in question but happen to share the same name. If this happened, Google’s efforts to 
stop infringement would also harm both posters of noninfringing material and users seeking 
noninfringing material. Indeed, efforts to suppress copyright infringement might significantly 
reduce the value of Google’s search engine technology. 
 
Unfortunately for Google, however, the factual record was too undeveloped to support 
these arguments. Neither party had introduced much evidence about the removal of search 
listings, their efficacy, nor the unintended consequences of such removal. Accordingly, it was 
still possible for Perfect 10 to show that Google could cheaply and effectively disable access to 
specific infringing files without affecting noninfringing behavior. The District Court did not yet 
know enough about Google’s technology to decide otherwise, so further fact finding was 
necessary before the District Court could rule on Perfect 10’s motion for injunctive relief. 
 
In Visa, the plaintiff Perfect 10 (the same plaintiff as in Amazon) sued the credit card 
companies Visa and MasterCard for processing of credit card payments on behalf of websites 
that displayed infringing copies of Perfect 10 photographs. These websites operated as so-called 
“pay” websites, charging users a fee for access to images including those that infringed Perfect 
10’s copyrights. Perfect 10 claimed that its complaints put the credit card companies on notice 
that their financial services supported infringement, and that their continued provision of those 
services made them liable for the websites’ infringement.42 As in Amazon, the defendants moved 
                                                 
42 Visa, 494 F.3d at 792-93. 
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to dismiss. This time, the 9th Circuit agreed with the defendants and affirmed the district court’s 
decision to dismiss.43
 
Once again, a tort analysis explains the Ninth Circuit’s decision fairly well. The credit 
card companies were surely not intentional tortfeasors, as they did not specifically want to cause 
infringement. Similarly, the credit card companies did not have a principal/agent relationship 
with the infringing websites, nor are credit card services abnormally dangerous activities or 
defective products.44 Accordingly, strict liability seems inappropriate as well. 
 
Negligence, however, presents a harder case, especially in light of Amazon. If Perfect 10 
might have proven that Google had simple, inexpensive, effective, and well-targeted precaution 
against infringement, might not Perfect 10 have done likewise with respect to credit card 
companies? Further analysis shows that the case against the credit card companies was not as 
close as the one against Google. 
In Amazon, Perfect 10 wanted Google to withdraw search results selectively in response 
to specific allegations of infringement. This left open the possibility that Google’s alleged 
negligence (namely the failure to withdraw particular search results) supported only infringing 
behavior. In Visa, Perfect 10 effectively claimed that the credit card companies were negligent 
for providing services to a long list of websites.45 These websites, however, did more than 
infringe Perfect 10’s copyrights. Most, if not all, displayed images that did not infringe Perfect 
10’s copyrights, and many displayed noninfringing text or images, as well as advertisements for 
various goods and services.46 This meant that the credit card companies’ alleged negligence 
simultaneously supported both infringing and noninfringing activity.  
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 See Rest. 3d (Torts) § 20 (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005) (describing abnormally dangerous activities as 
those creating a “foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm.”) (emphasis added). 
45 Id. at 800 (referring to Perfect 10’s allegation “that Defendants are still contributory infringers 
because they could refuse to process payments to the infringing websites and thereby undermine 
their commercial viability.”). 
46 It is tricky to document the practices of the websites that Perfect 10 complained about. Perfect 
10 apparently sent complaint letters listing large numbers of websites that allegedly infringed 
Perfect 10 material. Exhibit 4 to Perfect 10’s First Amended Complaint contains a long list of 
websites alleged by Perfect 10 to have infringed Perfect 10’s copyrighted material. See First 
Amended Complaint, Case No. C04-00371, at paragraph 70, available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/california/candce/5:2004cv00371/17337/40/0.html (allegation that Exhibit 4 contains list 
of infringers); http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/california/candce/5:2004cv00371/17337/40/4.html (list of sites alleged to have infringed). 
 
These websites may or may not appear the way they looked when Perfect 10 filed its 
complaint, and indeed some have apparently disappeared. Nevertheless, cursory inspection of a 
few reveals that the websites display images which may or may not infringe copyrights held by 
others, contain links to other websites, distribute text apparently original to the websites’ 
proprietors, and advertise various apparently legitimate articles for sale. See 
http://celeborama.com/ (visited November 28, 2008); 
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More importantly, and in contrast to the situation in Amazon, Perfect 10 could not 
possibly show how the credit card companies could withdraw their services from these websites 
without destroying all of this associated noninfringing activity. Consider how Perfect 10’s 
desired precaution would work. According to Perfect 10, withdrawing credit card services would 
reduce infringement by putting offending websites out of business.47 However, if the desired 
precaution implied the destruction of these businesses, it necessarily also implied the destruction 
of all their noninfringing activities. In short, the unintended effect of the proposed precaution on 
noninfringing activities was too large, making the withdrawal of credit card services 
unreasonable.  To put it differently, the credit card companies’ support of noninfringing activity 
made the incidental support of infringement reasonable, leading the court to grant the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
 
III. Inducement and Contributory Liability as Expressed in Amazon and Visa 
 
Common law tort reasonably explains Amazon and Visa’s results. By contrast, the 
doctrines of third party copyright liability do not do nearly as well. Problems arise because courts 
do not pay adequate attention to the structure of tort law. This renders third party copyright 
liability unfaithful to its tort roots and compromises conceptual and analytical clarity. The result 
is an inflexible formulation of doctrine that threatens overbroad liability and fails to direct 
judicial attention to important facts.  
 
Amazon’s description of inducement and contributory liability exhibited these problems. 
These two causes of action are conceptually distinct, but the Ninth Circuit lumped them together. 
The Amazon court understood Grokster as establishing two forms of contributory liability–
intentional inducement and the distribution of technology supporting infringement.48 The first 
clearly corresponds to inducement. The second apparently corresponds to traditional contributory 
infringement. A defendant who simply distributes technology without intent to cause 
infringement may “materially contribute” to infringement. If she does materially contribute with 
knowledge that infringement will ensue, contributory liability would follow. The Ninth Circuit 
could have used this interpretation of the law to develop a clear understanding of inducement and 
traditional contributory liability based upon tort principles. Unfortunately, the court missed this 
opportunity.  
 
As noted above, the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate decision to require further fact finding is 
defensible under common law tort principles.49 However, the court did not describe inducement 
and contributory liability in a way that connected third party copyright liability to tort. The court 
began by correctly rejecting the possibility of Google’s liability for merely distributing its search 
engine.50 Google’s search engine had numerous noninfringing uses, and Sony stands for the 
general proposition that a defendant cannot be liable simply for distributing technology with 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.celebflix.com/free_sm/index.htm (visited November 28, 2008); 
http://www.mrskin.com/main (visited November 28, 2008). 
47 Id. at 800. 
48 Amazon I, 487 F.3d 726. 
49 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
50 Amazon I, 487 F.3d 727. 
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substantial noninfringing use. However, because the court had enumerated only inducement and 
the distribution of technology as possible bases for liability, intentional inducement became the 
only possible theory under which to justify denying Google’s motion to dismiss.51 This proved 
problematic because Google did not look like an intentional inducer. Google clearly did not 
operate its search engine for the purpose of causing infringement. At best, Google operated its 
search engine knowing that eventually the technology would support infringement. The court 
attempted to fix this problem by stating that Google might be liable because it knew with 
substantial certainty that its technology would support infringement. 
 
At first blush, this maneuver seems sensible and consistent with tort law. However, closer 
inspection reveals a serious problem, namely that every Internet technology provider knows that 
its technology will eventually support infringement. This implies that, unless some nuance enters 
the analysis, every Internet technology provider is liable for intentional inducement. The Ninth 
Circuit obviously did not desire such a result, and it avoided this scenario by grafting the 
doctrine of traditional contributory liability onto inducement. The court wrote, “[W]e hold that a 
computer system operator can be held contributorily liable if it ‘has actual knowledge that 
specific infringing material is available using its system’ and can ‘take simple measures to 
prevent further damage’ to copyrighted works, yet continues to provide access to infringing 
works.”52  
 
Brief reflection shows that, from a tort perspective, Amazon has improperly confused 
intentional torts and negligence. To be sure, courts will sometimes hold a defendant liable for an 
intentional tort if the defendant acts knowing with substantial certainty that injury will occur.53 
However, as noted earlier, that sort of intentional tort liability does not apply to certainty arising 
from the repetition of relatively small risk. It applies instead to the sort of certainty associated 
with a single, high probability (i.e. “substantially certain”) event. When defendants create the 
certainty of injury through repeated encounters of lower risk events, courts use negligence to 
decide whether to hold the defendant liable at all. Courts do this because negligence allows 
courts to make nuanced determinations about the reasonableness of a defendant’s behavior, 
especially when compared to the relatively wooden determinations that govern intentional torts. 
 
Amazon’s confusion eventually causes trouble precisely because Amazon’s doctrinal 
formulation is too wooden. Copyright holders can notify practically every third party copyright 
defendant that “specific infringing material is available” because of the defendant’s behavior, 
and it is easy to argue that third party defendants can take “simple measures to prevent further 
damage.” After all, defendants who somehow support infringers can terminate those 
                                                 
51 Id. at 727 (considering possible liability of credit card companies for intentionally encouraging 
infringement). 
52 Id. at 729 (citations omitted). 
53 The classic case is Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955). See also 
Rest. 2d (Torts) §8A (1965) (“The word ‘intent’ is used throughout the Restatement of this 
Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that 
the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. 
Physical Harm § 1 (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005) (intent exists if a person acts “knowing that the 
consequence is substantially certain to result.”). 
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relationships or otherwise withdraw the relevant services. If the defendant knows with 
substantial certainty that her behavior supports infringement and continues that behavior, she 
must intend to cause that infringement, and liability should follow. 
 
This formulation holds far too many defendants liable for infringement committed by 
others. For example, an electrical power company could take the simple precaution of 
terminating electric service to infringers. If a copyright holder were to ever notify a power 
company that certain customers infringed specific works, liability apparently follows from 
Amazon’s doctrinal formulation. From a tort perspective, this liability is problematic because 
electricity simultaneously supports a customer’s noninfringing as well as infringing activity, and 
there is no way for the electric company to withdraw support only from infringement. If courts 
imposed liability on the power company (or any other provider of basic services) simply for 
continuing to provide services to customers accused of infringement, socially undesirable results 
would follow. Prudent, risk-averse electrical companies would begin immediately cutting power 
off to anyone accused of infringement. Although society would benefit from stopping a good 
deal of infringement, society would lose even more in the form of legitimate business activities. 
This explains why the Ninth Circuit erred in its application of tort law to copyright. Simple 
complaints of infringement alone should not create liability for those who support infringement, 
even if the suggested precaution is “simple.” At the very least, liability should require 
consideration of the unintended consequences of precaution on noninfringing activity. Courts can 
generally find these consequences by studying the defendant’s simultaneous support of 
noninfringing activity and a determining whether any suggested precaution against infringement 
will also destroy noninfringing activity.  
 
Visa illustrates the problems that arise when courts try to follow the Amazon formulation. 
The Visa majority understandably dismissed the credit card company defendants, but it struggled 
to explain its decision cogently. According to the opinion, the court could not hold the credit card 
defendants liable for contributory infringement because they did not materially contribute to 
infringement. The Visa majority distinguished the case at hand from Amazon on the ground that 
the credit card companies’ support of infringement was indirect when compared to the support 
offered by Google’s search engine: 
 
The search engines in Amazon.com provided links to specific infringing images, 
and the services in Napster and Grokster allowed users to locate and obtain 
infringing material. Here, in contrast, the services provided by the credit card 
companies do not help locate and are not used to distribute the infringing images. 
While Perfect 10 has alleged that Defendants make it easier for websites to profit 
from this infringing activity, the issue here is reproduction, alteration, display and 
distribution, which can occur without payment. Even if infringing images were 
not paid for, there would still be infringement.54
 
The majority further argued that liability broad enough to encompass the credit card defendants 
would be absurdly broad, including “a number of peripherally-involved third parties, such as 
computer display companies, storage device companies, and software companies that make the 
                                                 
54 Visa, 494 F.3d at 796. 
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software necessary to alter and view the pictures and even utility companies that provide 
electricity to the Internet.”55
 
The majority’s arguments make sense. Surely it is reasonable for some defendants to 
remain in business even if they know that their products or services sometimes support 
infringement. Unfortunately, Amazon’s formulation did not give the Visa court the tools to 
express or guide its thoughts about the relationship between credit card services and third party 
infringement or the consequences of liability. As Judge Kozinski pointed out in dissent, credit 
card services are arguably crucial to the commission of infringement, making their support 
material. Additionally, the credit card companies knew that their services supported 
infringement, and they could have done something simple (i.e. withdraw services) to stop the 
infringement.56 Thus, under the wooden formulation of liability inherited from Amazon, liability 
was sufficiently plausible for Perfect 10 to survive a motion to dismiss. 
 
In short, the Visa majority lacked the very thing identified as missing from Amazon, 
namely the realization that courts must consider unintended consequences against noninfringing 
activity before concluding that complaints of infringement create contributory liability. If 
Amazon had recognized this, the Visa court would have been able to better explain its intuition 
about credit card services in terms of tort law. Instead of arguing that credit cards do not offer 
material support for infringement (an argument insufficiently clear to support a motion to 
dismiss), the Visa majority should have focused more on the case against liability for the electric 
company, a result that Judge Kozinski’s dissent accepted.57 For purposes of negligence, credit 
card companies greatly resemble electric companies. Both simultaneously and inseparably 
support infringing and noninfringing behavior. If either takes the proposed precaution of 
withdrawing service from alleged infringers, it will stop everything the infringer does, including 
all noninfringing activity. If, as seems uncontested, this justifies the electric company’s 
incidental support of infringement even after a copyright holder complains, the same result 
should follow for credit card companies. In either case, a motion to dismiss seems appropriate.  
 
IV. Connecting Inducement and Contributory Liability to Tort 
 
Two related things must happen to fix the problems created by Amazon. First, courts 
should pay more attention to the distinction between intentional tort and negligence in third party 
copyright liability. In the vast majority of third party copyright liability cases, defendants will not 
have acted with the specific purpose of causing others to infringe. This means intentional tort, 
including inducement, offers the wrong theory under which to analyze third party copyright 
liability claims. Negligence offers the correct theory. Courts may be tempted, as in Amazon, to 
analyze potential third party copyright liability under the “knowing with substantial certainty” 
branch of intentional tort. However, in the vast majority of cases, this form of liability would be 
                                                 
55 Id. at 800. 
56 Id. at 811-12, 816. 
57 Id. at 816 (expressing confidence that courts could distinguish Perfect 10’s claim against the 
credit card companies from “lawsuits against utility companies, software vendors and others who 
provide incidental services to infringers”). 
-17- 
inappropriate because the certain infringement associated with the defendant’s behavior arises 
from the repetition of less-than-certain risk, and not a single occurrence with a certain outcome. 
 
Second, courts should reformulate the law of traditional contributory liability to better 
express the nuances of negligence law. There are presently two elements to contributory liability, 
knowledge and material contribution. However, these elements do not draw judicial attention to 
the considerations that matter most to a sensitive negligence analysis. As noted earlier, a proper 
assessment of a third party defendant’s culpability requires attention to at least three things: the 
cost or difficulty of the plaintiff’s proposed precaution against infringement, the effectiveness of 
that precaution, and the unintended consequences of the proposed precaution.58
 
These considerations simply do not fit well into the elements of knowledge and material 
contribution. Knowledge and material contribution affect a defendant’s potential culpability, but 
they do not tell the whole story. As the Visa court discovered, a long line of entirely legitimate 
businesses provide crucial support for copyright infringement. This line includes ISPs, computer 
manufacturers, software producers, stationery stores, and even the telephone and power 
companies. All of these (and indeed many more) potential defendants know that their services 
sometimes support infringement. Courts would probably not hold such defendants contributorily 
liable, but analysis of knowledge and material contribution do not explain why because those 
elements do not measure the difficulty or expense of precaution, the effectiveness of precaution, 
or the consequences of precaution for noninfringing behavior. 
 
Things would work much better if courts reworked contributory liability by connecting it 
to the factors on which culpability depends. For example, a better definition of contributory 
liability might state, “A defendant is contributorily liable if he engages in specific behavior that  
he knows materially contributes to an amount of infringement that is unreasonably large when 
compared to 1) any noninfringing behavior simultaneously supported by that behavior and 2) the 
cost or difficulty of preventing infringement.” 
 
The steps suggested here would have avoided the difficulties encountered in Amazon and 
Visa. As an initial matter, a better understanding of the distinction between intentional tort and 
negligence would probably have changed Amazon’s intentional tort analysis of third party 
copyright liability to negligence. The Amazon court could then have explained that the amount of 
infringement supported by Google’s “infringing” listings might be unreasonable when compared 
to any support for noninfringing behavior and the ease of withdrawing support. This conclusion 
would follow if the plaintiff showed that Google knew of specific search results supporting 
infringement, that these search results did not also support noninfringing behavior, and that 
Google could easily remove these search results at a reasonable cost.  
 
Even better, the Visa court could have used the suggested reformulation of contributory 
liability to explain why its case differed from Amazon. Instead of having to argue that the 
defendants supported infringement only indirectly, the Visa court could have noted that credit 
card services supported the sale of access to both infringing and noninfringing images, plus any 
other noninfringing commerce conducted by the primary infringers. The Ninth Circuit could then 
                                                 
58 See supra  Part II. 
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have identified the unintended consequences of precaution on noninfrininging behavior and 
concluded that the amount of supported infringement was reasonable in light of the 
noninfringing behavior supported by credit card services, even if the defendants could have 
easily and cheaply terminated those services. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This Article has shown that Amazon and Visa suffered because the Ninth Circuit did not 
successfully integrate third party copyright liability and tort law. This was partly due to the 
court’s lack of clarity about the distinction between intentional torts and negligence, but the court 
was also hampered by the existing formulation of contributory liability that did not express tort 
values very well. The Article has further shown that courts can improve the law of third party 
copyright liability by reworking the definition of contributory liability to include explicit 
consideration of factors that heavily affect a defendant’s culpability. The suggested change is not 
radical. All that courts need do is evaluate whether a defendant’s knowing support of 
infringement is reasonable in light of the defendant’s simultaneous support for noninfringing 
behavior and the cost and difficulty of stopping infringement.  
 
There may, of course, be other factors affecting a defendant’s culpability beyond those 
identified here. However, it is clear that the existing law of contributory liability needs to be 
refined. Hopefully, this Article will help courts find improvements that implement the Supreme 
Court’s clear statement that the law of third party copyright liability rests upon the common law 
of tort. 
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